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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature ofthe case.
Alan Golub (Golub) obtained a default judgment against Geraldine Kirk-Hughes

(Kirk-Hughes), Kirk-Hughes Development (KHD), and Kirk-Hughes & Associates in 2009
(eollectively the Kirk-Hughes defendants). He properly undertook colleetion efforts which were
impeded by KHD's two bankruptcies, which were dismissed. He was further impeded by a claim
that another entity, Kirk-Scott, LLC (a company owned in large part by Kirk-Hughes' sister,
Balinda Antoine), claimed a deed of trust on the real property owned by KHD, which was
superior to the Golubs' judgment lien; that deed was purportedly given in 2004 and recorded in
violation of the bankruptcy stay in 2010.

Golub brought an action for declaratory relief to

establish his judgment priority against Kirk-Scott, and the trial court granted summary judgment
establishing Golub's priority.

That action was consolidated with this action, in which the

Kirk-Hughes defendants join Kirk-Seott to assert that the trial eourt erred in ruling that the
Golubs' judgment had priority, and in awarding sanctions.
B.

Statement of facts.
Originally, Alan Golub commeneed suit against KHD, Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, and

Kirk-Hughes & Associates, as well as other defendants including Kelly Polatis and the
Petersons, because instead of paying a real estate eommission owed for proeuring a sale of
property owned by the Petersons, the various parties tortiously manipulated sales of the property
to avoid the real estate commission. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 162-169) After defending the case for a year
and a

half~

the Kirk-Hughes defendants defaulted, and Mr. Golub obtained a judgment against
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them in the amount of $941,000 on March 11, 2009.

(R. Vol. f, pp. 35-37)

KHD filed for

bankruptcy on April 6, 2009 in Nevada. (R. Vol. 1, p. 79) While that bankruptcy was pending,
Kirk-Scott LLC recorded a Deed of Trust on the property owned by KHD; the Deed of trust was
purportedly given in 2004. (Augmented Record, lvlay 3, 20f3 Afl of/vlichael T Howard, E,\:. 5)
Kirk-Scott is a company owned by Geraldine Kirk-Hughes' sister, Balinda Antoine. Kirk-Scott
is a 51.5% member of KHD; Antoine is a 3% member. (Augmented Record, May 3, 20f 3 Ail

(~l

Michael T Howard, E'(. 10, p. 23) On October 28,2010, KIlD's bankruptcy was dismissed, and

having resolved the remaining claims against the remaining defendant, Peterson, Golub rerecorded his judgment. (R. Vol. L p. 35)
C.

Course of proceedings.
When Golub thereafter learned that Kirk-Scott had recorded a Deed of Trust against the

properties, he filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the priority of his judgment lien
against all persons claiming interest, which included Kirk-Scott, the IRS. and the Kirk-Hughes
Defendants. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32) Golub moved for summary judgment to establish that his
judgment lien was prior to the improperly recorded Kirk-Scott Deed of Trust, which was
allegedly given in 2004, but not recorded until September 2010. (R. Vol. f, pp. 67-97)
The trial court granted Mr. Golub's motion for summary judgment, finding his judgment
lien to be valid and prior to the Kirk-Scott unrecorded Deed of trust. (R. Vol. L pp. 414-421)
The trial court also awarded sanctions against both Kirk-Scott and the Kirk-Hughes Defendants
for improperly bringing a motion to amend judgment unde; Rule 59. Kirk-Scott appealed on a
variety of issues; the remaining Kirk-Hughes Defendants also appealed, but limited this appeal to
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two issues: 1) that the district court erred beeause Mr. Golub had knowledge of the Kirk-Scott
deed of trust, which precluded his priority under the good faith requirement of Idaho Code
§55-606; and 2) that the trial court erred in awarding sanctions against the Kirk-Hughes
defendants because while they had joined in an improper motion, they had not filed additional
briefing. The Kirk-Hughes Defendants misstate both the law and the facts relevant to the priority
issue, and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions, so no basis for reversal
exists.

ARGUMENT
The Kirk-Hughes defendants' argument regarding Golub's "knowledge" of the

year

old deed of trust misapplies the relevant law; Golub was not a purchaser and so his good faith
knowledge is wholly irrelevant to the priority of his judgment lien. Even so, the Kirk-Hughes
defendants also mischaracterize the facts to assert Golub had actual knowledge of the deed;
proper analysis of the. testimony establishes his lack of actual knowledge, and the Kirk-Hughes
defendants concede the defective and void 2010 recordation could not have provided
constructive notice.
Moreover, while the Kirk-Hughes defendants did not file additional briefing on the
motion to amend, it is undisputed they joined the motion in violation of I.R.c.P. Il(a). As a
result, the court did not err in ordering the Kirk-Hughes defendants to share in the order on
sanctions.
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A.

Idaho's priority statute does not impose the obligation on a judgment debtor to
exercise bona fide purchaser "good faith" to establish its priority.
The Kirk-Hughes defendants assert that the trial court should have found that Golub's

judgment lien is inferior to Kirk-Scott's Deed of Trust under I.C. §55-606 because the trial court
failed to find that Golubs exercised "good faith"; this is a misapplication of the requirement of
the priority statute.

That requirement applies to purchasers or encumbrancers, and not to

judgment liens.
Idaho Code §55-606 governs the treatment of a judgment lien in determining priority of
interests in real property and provides:
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration,
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly
recorded. (Emphasis added)

I.e. §55-606.
The Kirk-Hughes defendants' position rests upon an interpretation of

I.e.

§55-606 that

conditions the priority of a judgment lien upon good faith. I Courts interpreting a statute are to
give effect to legislative intent. See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d
951 (2003). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute.

Statev. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007). The plain meaning of a statute
therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain

I The Kirk-Hughes defendants do not also address the requirement "for valuable consideration" which is addressed
in the Kirk-Scott appeal. Presumably, that requirement is ignored here because it underscores the lack of logical
application ofthe statute to a judgment lien.
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meaning leads to absurd results. 1d. If the language of the statute is capable of more than one
reasonable construction it is ambiguous. An ambiguous statute must be construed to mean what
the legislature intended it 10 mean. 1d. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court examines not
only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the
policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 1d.
By its plain terms, I.C. §55-606 does not condition the priority of a judgment lien upon
food faith or the giving of additional consideration. When read as a whole, the statute provides
protection for two classes of interest holders: (1) a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good
faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument; or (2) a valid
judgment lien. In appropriate statutory interpretation, the word "or" indicates alternative things;
in a statute should be given its usual disjunctive meaning. State v. Rivera, 131 Idaho 8, 10, 951
P.2d 528(Ct. App. 1998). These clauses here must be read disjunctively, because use of the
word "lien" more than once would be redundant and superfluous if the statute were not intended
to distinguish a valid judgment lien from a lien by any another instrument taken in good faith for
consideration.
A review of the legislative history behind the 1989 amendment to the statute supports this
reading. Prior to 1989, the statute did not include reference to judgment liens. In 1989, the
legislature amended the statute by including the single phrase "or valid judgment lien."
(R. Vol. 1, p. 3..f6) The stated purpose of the amendment provides:

This legislation would provide that a valid judgment lien that is first duly
recorded has priority over subsequently recorded grants or conveyances of an
estate in real property.
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(R. Vol J, p. 347)

The minutes of the Judiciary and Rules Committee further provide:
Senator Crapo presented this legislation and stated that it clarifies the effect of a
valid judgment lien regarding a grant or conveyance of an estate in real property.
The Supreme Court has recently allowed a judgment to be eliminated if the
property is sold before collection can be made.
(R. Vol. I, p. 347)

Reading the statute to require a judgment lienholder to exercise good faith or produce
additional consideration is somewhat of a square peg in a round hole, and leads to an absurd
result.

The necessity of good faith and consideration serves the purpose of protecting the

purchaser: a purchaser must exercise good faith to determine whether any prior interests exist on
the property so that he knows what he is purchasing. The failure the possessor of an interest in
property to provide would-be purchasers with notice of that prior interest necessarily may not use
the failure to disclose to their advantage. This principle is based upon the notion of a bargained
for exchange to allow the purchaser of an interest in land to know what he or she is buying.
A lien by judgment is wholly different. A judgment line is not bartered for or exchanged
for value; the holder obtains its interest as a matter of a statutory lien granted to judgment
creditors. See

I.e.

§ 10-11lO. It exists as a matter of law, and not in an exercise of reaching a

deal with the record owner or others. The judgment creditor cannot protect itself by choosing
not to have been injured by the property owner, which give it its lien rights.

There is no

additional consideration necessary to give rise to the rights, nor is there any notice or knowledge
of other superseding interest that impacts its rights: it simply is.
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A judgment holder has no such ability or requirement. It obtains its interest as a matter of
a statutory lien granted to judgment creditors.

I.e. § 10-111 O.

It exists as a matter of law, and

not in an exercise of reaching a deal with the record owner or others, as by giving consideration.
The judgment lien holder's knowledge of other interests is irrelevant to its lien. Recordation is
the only requisite to secure its priority.
Accordingly, neither the text of I.e. §55-606 nor the courts interpreting it require that any
finding of good faith or additional consideration, beyond the underlying obligation giving rise to
the judgment, is necessary for the holder of a valid judgment lien to avail himself to the
protections of I.e. §55-606. The Kirk-Hughes defendants' argument underscores the absurdity
that such a read of the statute would result in, and the trial court properly awarded Golub priority
as a judgment lienholder without such findings.
B.

No disputed issues of fact establish Mr. Golub's actual knowledge of Kirk-Scott's
deed of trust.
Even were Golub required to establish his good faith, the undisputed facts establish that

he had no actual knowledge of the Kirk-Scott deed of trust. Put very simply, the Kirk-Hughes
Defendants specify four pieces of evidence that they assert create an issue of fact, or establish
Mr. Golub's knowledge regarding the Kirk-Scott deed of trust before he re-recorded his
judgment in October 2009.

In each instance, the evidence does not raise an issue of fact

sufficient to defeat summary judgment, or reverse the trial court opinion.
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The Kirk-Hughes Defendants first incorrectly assert that Golub testified he \vas aware of
the deed of trust when Kirk-Scott recorded it on September 17, 2010.

Mr. Golub's affidavit

actually stated:
14.
was not a\vare that Kirk-Scott had executed a deed of trust to KirkHughes Development prior to Kirk-Scott recording one during Kirk-Hughes
Development's bankruptcy on September 17,2010.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 96) Golub was testifying only as to his knowledge prior to September 7. 2010. His

affidavit is silent regarding his knowledge on or after September 17, 2010, and the Kirk-Hughes
defendants simply restate the above "conversely" to reach the conclusion that Golub

he

became aware on that date. This is not what the affidavit says, and the Kirk-Hughes defendants
cannot restate someone's testimony to create alleged inconsistencies.
Silence on an issue does not create a disputed fact, particularly when Golub testified
directly on the issue in his deposition:
Q.

All right. Prior to 2013 when you were first handed a physical copy of the
November 18, 2004 Kirk-Scott deed of trust, did you have any idea that
Kirk-Scott claimed an interest in the properties?

A.

I did not know of any claim of interest in the properties or this deed of
trust. No, I did not.

(R. Vol. I, p. 99)

Thus, the statements in the Atlidavit of Golub identify a period in which he was unaware
of the Deed of Trust, but do not identify that he had actual knowledge of the filing. lIe simply
did not opine in his Affidavit that he was aware as of September 17, 2010, and his subsequent
deposition testimony, during which KHD could have questioned him on the Aflldavit, clearly
establishes that he did not know of the Deed of Trust until it was physically shown to him in
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2013.

The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' attempt to utilize a specific interpretation, or

misinterpretation, of Golub's one line sentence does not create an inconsistency with his actual
testimony on when he became aware of the September 17, 2010 fIling. Trying to read disputed
facts into the two statements are necessary for the Kirk-Hughes Defendants, because there
simply is no evidence of Golub's actual knowledge of that filing.
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' liberal recitation of the facts in the record is underscored
by the other two pieces of testimony on which the Kirk-Hughes Defendants rely to establish that
Mr. Golub was aware of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust. First, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants assert that
"Darlene Moore testified that... she personally informed Mr. Golub that Kirk-Scott had an
interest in the Sloan property." Darlene Moore's testimony was instead:

Affidavit of Darlene Moore
In November of 2004 .. .1 advised Alan that it was my belief that Ms. Kirk-Hughes was
still interested in the property and still interested in pursuing the development because
she had just recently created a corporation called Kirk-Hughes Development and had
asked me to prepare a Note and Deed of Trust in favor of her sister, Balinda
Antoine, to exchange for the title to the Sloan property that had been purchased in KirkScott, Ltd. name. Alan had proposed that Ms. Kirk-Hughes use the Sloan parcel to
acquire tinancing to assist Ms. Kirk-Hughes in purchasing the Peterson property. I told
them this was not possible as I had already prepared the mortgage in favor of
Balinda.

(R. Vol. 1. pp. 306-3(7) (emphasis added)

In 2006 ... 3) I reminded Alan that Balinda Antoine had a mortgage on the Sloan parcel
so there would be no asset to collect against.
(R. Vol. I, pp. 307-3(8)
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Ms. Moore's Atlidavit only purports to establish that she informed Golub that she
prepared some instrument, but provides no testimony that Golub had knowledge that an
instrument encumbering the property was actually executed. Moreover, Moore's Affidavit is
unclear as to whether she informed Golub that she prepared a Deed of Trust or a mortgage. 2
Clearly, if she informed Golub that she had prepared a mortgage, it cannot be said that he had
knowledge of a Deed of Trust.
What is clear from Ms. Moore's Atlidavit is that whatever encumbrance was intended,
she informed Golub that it related solely to the Sloan property3 and was in favor of Balinda
Antoine: not Kirk-Scott, Ltd. 4
Next, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants state that "Geraldine Kirk-Hughes testified that she
also informed Mr. Golub that a deed of trust was granted to Kirk-Scott."

In reality,

Ms. KIrk-Hughes' testimony was:

Affidavit of Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
In September 2004 .. .1 told Mr. Golub that I was forming a separate entity to develop the
land, and that title to all the properties would be transferred to the new company. I
specifically told Mr. Golub that I was giving my sister a mortgage or deed of trust to
secure Kirk-Scott, Ltd.'s interest. (Emphasis added)
(R. Vol. 1, p. 313)

2 Deeds of Trust differ from Mortgages in that deeds of trust always involve at least three parties, where the third

party holds the legal title, while in the context of mortgages. the mortgagor gives legal title directly to the
mortgagee.
3 The November 18, 2004 Deed of Trust identities only two of the three Sloan parcels, and includes the Atkinson
parcel. (R. Vol. I, pp. 39-·10)
4 Ms. Moore's Affidavit provides no foundation to establish she has personal knowledge of a mortgage executed in
favor of Balinda Antoine.
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In November of 2004, your af1iant requested Darlene Moore to prepare a Note and Deed
of Trust in favor of Kirk-Scott Ltd. to cover the monies spent by Balinda Antoine to
acquire the Sloan parcel. Your af1iant specifically informed Alan of this ....

CR. Vol. I, pp. 315-316)
After Ms. Moore prepared the Note and Deed, your Affiant signed the same ....

(R. Vol. 1, p. 316)
Ms. Kirk-Hughes' Af1idavit demonstrates her September 2004 intent to give Balinda

Antoine (as opposed to Kirk-Scott, Ltd.) a future mortgage or deed of tmst. It then states that
Golub was informed of a request to prepare a Deed of Tmst to Kirk-Scott in November 2004.
Finally, it evidences that after the document was prepared, it was executed by Ms. Kirk-Hughes.
Ultimately, the af1idavits submitted to contradict Golub's testimony only provide
evidence that Golub had knowledge of a desire or intent to encumber the property; they provide
no evidence that he had knowledge that such an encumbrance actually attached to any of the
subject properties.
As between a mortgagee and another claimant, one who has actual notice of the
other's prior claim or lien generally takes subject to it, even though the prior claim
or lien is unrecorded.
In order to have this effect, the notice or knowledge must be acquired prior to the
attaching of the rights of the party to be affected by it. Actual notice of a
mortgage is express, direct information. Notice does not mean a formal written
warning served on a party. Instead, it means actual knowledge of the fact in
question, regardless of how it was acquired. However, it must be knowledge of
the actual existence of the prior conveyance or encumbrance and not merely
information of a purpose or agreement on the part of the grantor to make or
give it.
59 C.l.S. Mortgages §298 (emphasis added).
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Construing the priority of interests under I.e. §55-612, the Idaho Supreme Court has
similarly held that knowledge of an intent to create or acquire an interest in property is not a
legally recognizable interest that would constitute an adverse claim for purposes of defeating the
status as a bona fide purchaser. In Sun Valley Hot ,)prings Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,
661 (1998), the Court explained this concept as follows:
In discussing whether a party had actual or constructive notice in regards to
determining its bona fide purchaser status, this Court in Bear Island Water Ass'n.
Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528 (1994), concluded that a party's prior
notice of another party's use of a well did not create a real property right in the
party using the well. A purchaser's prior notice of another party's use of property
does not create any real property right in the using party that would serve as an
adverse claim that could defeat the purchaser's status as a bona fide purchaser. Id.
at 725-26, 874 P.2d at 536-37. Where notice of another party's "use" of property
does not create a property right in the using party, it follows that notice of another
party's "intent" to use property in the future would not create a property right in
that party.
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 131 Idaho at 661.
In a recent decision addressing the same issue presented here, the Court in insight. LLC v.
Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 302 P.3d 1052 (2013), rejected evidence similar to that proffered by
Defendants, holding:
It is not technically possible for 1M to have notice of an encumbrance on property
before that encumbrance actually comes into existence. Though 1M knew that
Summitt was intending to execute a deed of trust, that was notice of an intent to
subsequently encumber property, not notice of an actual encumbrance on
property. Therefore, the district court's finding that 1M had notice of the Gunters'
deed of trust is clearly erroneous.

Insight, 154 Idaho at 783-84.
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Here, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants have not provided any evidence to contradict Golub's
testimony that he had no knowledge of Kirk-Scott's encumbrance prior to re-recording his
Judgment in October 2010. As a result, the trial court did not err in ruling that Golub's Judgment
lien was valid and had priority under I.C §55-606.
C.

The recordation of Kirk-Scott's deed of trust while the bankruptcy stay was in place
and with an improper acknOWledgement could not provide constructive notice.
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants apparently concede the acknowledgement on the deed of

trust filed on September 17, 2010 was defective, and the recording during the pendency of the
bankruptcy was void. The Kirk-Hughes defendants apparently agree that these defects preclude
constructive knowledge of the recordation, but argue that Golub's "actual knowledge" renders the
defects immaterial. However, as outlined above, Golub did not have actual knowledge, and thus
to the extent the Kirk-Hughes defendants have to establish constructive knowledge by the
recording, they cannot do so. As a result, Golub's judgment is prior to the defective recording of
the six-year old Deed of Trust.

D.

A sanctions order is an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion and no basis
exists for reversal.
The Kirk-Hughes Defendants joined in Kirk-Scott's motion to alter or amend the 2013

judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a), which was in reality a motion to reconsider the court's
ruling on

the Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the 2007 judgment, and prohibited by

I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). The Kirk-Hughes Defendants' appeal on the sanctions order is not based on
any assertion that the Rule 59 motion was appropriate, but is instead based on the fact that while
they joined the motion, the Kirk-Hughes Defendants did not file additional pleadings or advance
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any arguments in support of the motion. As a result. they argue the order for sanctions issued by
the court based upon an apportionment of the fees incurred in responding to the motion between
the two moving parties is incorrect.
However, l.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) is clear that the signature of an attorney on a pleading is the
conduct that subjects the party to sanctions if the pleading is not grounded in appropriate facts
and law. It is undisputed that the Kirk-Hughes Defendants were a moving party and "signed" the
pleading by joining the motion, thereby relying on the Kirk-Scott pleadings. Once the court
determined that the motion had no basis in law or fact, it had the discretion to award "sanctions,"
which "may" include the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the improper filing.
I.R.C.P. II(a)(1). The rule itself does not limit the sanction to a moving party that files briefing,
but is based instead on the submission of an improper pleading.
It is undisputed that the Kirk-Hughes defendants joined the motion and thus are subject to

the same sanction for the improper conduct; the court properly exercised its discretion in simply
splitting the amount of the sanction between the moving parties. See Campbell v. Kildew, 141
Idaho 640, 65 L 115 P.3d 731 (2005) (the amount of sanctions is committed to the "sound
discretion" of the court, and attorney fees incurred by the aggrieved party can serve as a "guide"
to the amount of the award). There is no law that limits the trial court's discretion in the award of
sanctions to an amount actually incurred by a party in responding to briefing. The trial court's
order on sanctions was a reasonable determination when both parties propound an Improper
motion. and no basis exists to reverse the award.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of the Golubs on the priority
of its lien should be affirmed, and the award of sanctions should be affirmed.
DATED this

~ifb&---

of April, 2014.
J/1

MICHAELT. HOWARD
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS
Attorneys for PlaintitTs
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